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WHAT THE GREAT RECESSION REVEALED ABOUT TAXATION BY 
CITATION AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT
Dick M. Carpenter II, Chelsea Lawson & Courtney Deuser*
ABSTRACT
In recent years, the issue of “taxation by citation” has grown in national 
prominence. It is generally defined as municipal revenue generation through fines and 
fees that transcends a clear relationship to public health and safety and serves more as a 
revenue generating device. According to critics, taxation by citation creates conflicts of 
interest, violates the rights of those with low income, and distorts law enforcement 
priorities. Municipal leaders reject such criticisms by denying taxation by citation even 
exists. To date, research findings have been mixed on whether cities practice taxation by 
citation. This Article examines whether there is a relationship between fines and fees 
revenue generation and broader economic trends. If there is a relationship, that would 
suggest cities do, indeed, use municipal ordinance enforcement and the resulting fines 
and fees as a means of revenue generation beyond public health and safety. We use a 
panel of 1,471 cities from the Census of Governments spanning 2005 through 2017, 
which captures the Great Recession of 2008. Fixed-effects regression analyses indicate 
a significant relationship between the fines and fees revenue trend and the Great 
Recession. We conclude by recommending legal reforms to eliminate the financial 
incentives to engage in taxation by citation. These include eliminating municipal 
courts, capping the revenue cities may retain from ordinance enforcement, and ensuring 
judicial independence from municipal executive and legislative branches.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines fines and fees revenue generation by cities 
and proposes legal reforms based on those findings. Specifically, we 
study whether there is a relationship between fines and fees revenue 
generation and broader economic trends as represented by the reces-
sion of 2008. Upon finding a significant relationship, we discuss how 
reforming certain state laws may help curb municipal ordinance en-
forcement expressly for budget-balancing purposes.
Generating revenue through traffic tickets and municipal code en-
forcement has a long history, but recently the practice has come under 
increased scrutiny due to concerns that it may be transcending public 
health and safety goals and instead serving primarily as a revenue-
generating device. Some scholars call this phenomenon “taxation by ci-
tation.”1
When a city generates a large percentage of revenue from fines and 
fees, that may signal taxation by citation. There is not yet an agreed-
upon definition of “excessive” in the generation of fines and fees reve-
nue, but one observer has suggested that a threshold of 10% of a city’s 
revenue from fines and fees may be cause for concern.2 Indeed, Govern-
ing magazine set 10% as its threshold when studying cities engaged in 
taxation by citation.3
For critics, there are legal and social problems associated with taxa-
tion by citation including: (1) conflicts of interest; (2) violation of the 
rights of people with low income; and (3) distortions in law enforcement 
priorities. First, because municipal courts are often funded by the fines, 
and particularly fees, generated by citations issued in their cities,4 this 
1. See, e.g., Min Su, Taxation by Citation? Exploring Local Governments’ Revenue Motive for Traffic Fines,
80 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 36 (2020); C. Jarrett Dieterle, Citation Nation, CITY J. (Apr. 4, 2017), https://
www.city-journal.org/html/citation-nation-15093.html [https://perma.cc/5S2H-PVYB]; Fred Foldvary, 
Taxation by Citation, PROGRESS (Nov. 15, 2015), https://www.progress.org/articles/taxation-by-citation
[https://perma.cc/PLE8-UA95]; Josh Mitchell, Sen. Schatz Reports Progress Was Made in Legislative Session,
THE MISSOURIAN (May 21, 2015), https://www.emissourian.com/news/state/sen-schatz-reports-
progress-was-made-in-legislative-session/article_9b6beb81-aa90-5f5f-951a-ff3cace4d969.html [https://
perma.cc/8KQT-74JL]; Melissa Bailey, “No Taxation Through Citation!”, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Apr. 3, 
2012, 7:46 AM), https://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/red_light_
cameras_protest/ [https://perma.cc/KM3G-WHZE].
2. Andria Simmons, Traffic Tickets: Atlanta’s Ticket Traps: Slow Down or Pay, ATLANTA J.-CONST.
(Oct. 24, 2014), https://www.ajc.com/news/transportation/atlanta-ticket-traps-slow-down-pay
/6JZfycaeaKQ3jYJGRxtHII [https://perma.cc/Z3PL-R5DZ].
3. See Mike Maciag, Addicted to Fines: A Special Report, GOVERNING (Aug. 16, 2019), https://
www.governing.com/archive/fine-fee-revenues-special-report.html [https://perma.cc/CX33-NPVM].
4. Dick Carpenter, Ricard Pochkhanawala & Mindy Menjou, Municipal Fines and Fees: A 50-
State Survey of State Laws, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/report/fines-and-fees-home/ [https://
perma.cc/27P3-F46L] (last visited June 30, 2021).
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may create conflicts of interest. This seems counter to U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions that judges ought not preside over cases in which con-
victions can produce financial benefits either for the judge directly or 
for the city.5 The same expectation applies to prosecutors.6
Second, civil rights violations can occur by penalizing poverty. Jus-
tice Sandra Day O’Connor described the incarceration of poor people 
for nonpayment of fines and fees as “fundamentally unfair” absent the 
exploration of community service, installment payments, or other al-
ternative sentences.7 Incarcerating people for the inability to pay fines 
and fees has been declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court 
since the 1970s.8 Yet, the practice continues.9
Third, distortion of law enforcement priorities can occur when rais-
ing revenue is municipalities’ primary motivation for creating or en-
forcing ordinances.10 This, too, has generated court opinions. Paying 
enforcement expenses and deterring violations through monetary sanc-
tions are legitimate,11 but revenue production is not.12 As one court cau-
tioned, “it must be remembered that courts generally, and traffic courts 
in particular, are not collection agencies and should not be made 
such.”13
Despite these legal opinions, recent evidence suggests that munici-
palities continue to view citations primarily as a source of revenue.14
The most prominent example is Ferguson, Missouri. After the 2014 
5. See Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59–62 (1972); see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 
510, 535 (1927).
6. See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1980).
7. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668–69 (1983).
8. See id.; Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
9. See Timothy Williams, Courts Sidestep the Law, and South Carolina’s Poor Go to Jail, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/us/south-carolina-jail-no-lawyer.html
[https://perma.cc/YJH2-MCYK].
10. Richard A. Ginkowski, Beyond Ferguson: Community-Based or Cash-Register Justice?, 33 CRIM.
JUST. 14 (2018).
11. Vill. of Sister Bay v. Hockers, 317 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
12. State ex rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger, 201 N.W.2d 778, 781 n.2 (Wis. 1972).
13. Id. at 784.
14. See Tia Mitchell, Judge: Lawsuit Against Doraville over Tickets, Fees Can Continue, ATLANTA J.-
CONST. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt—politics/judge-lawsuit-against-
doraville-over-tickets-fees-can-continue/Ox9nDMs5frOgSS5QXAfk8K/ [https://perma.cc/W8G6-
GZVR]; see also Jessica Karins, Pagedale Agrees to Consent Decree to Stop Frivolously and Illegally Ticketing 
Residents, ST. LOUIS AM. (May 30, 2018), http://www.stlamerican.com/news/local_news/pagedale-
agrees-to-consent-decree-to-stop-frivolously-and-illegally/artcle_c8fb8060-6443-11e8-a01b-
8b545946b9c7.html [https://perma.cc/9GDG-ZRUQ]; Tia Mitchell, Lawsuit Says Doraville Budget Re-
lies Too Heavily on Fines, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (May 30, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/lawsuit-
says-doraville-budget-relies-too-heavily-fines/6Ff8riVSV9hR6XOWFuRGuM/ [https://perma.cc/
3PB4-QJ2P].
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shooting of Michael Brown and the protests that ensued, a U.S. De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) investigation found that the city’s aggressive 
revenue-generating activities through code enforcement contributed 
significantly to the social tensions present in the city before Brown’s 
death.15 During the four years leading up to Brown’s shooting, despite 
being a city with a population of about 21,000 people, Ferguson issued 
90,000 citations, typically for nonserious16 offenses.17
Ferguson, however, is by no means an isolated case. In a ranking of 
cities across the country in terms of their fines and fees revenue genera-
tion, Ferguson came in at only number eighteen.18 It ranked below cit-
ies distributed throughout the country, including in Georgia, Illinois, 
Maryland, Missouri, New York, Utah, and Tennessee.19 Moreover, re-
sults from empirical analyses strongly suggest that the revenue genera-
tion of many cities exceeds levels that would be expected if codes were 
enforced primarily for the purpose of public safety.20 Although illustra-
tive, such examples are just that: examples. Systematic, empirical 
scholarship on taxation by citation is nascent. Advocacy organizations 
are producing research on the topic, but they tend to be legal studies,21
fiscal administration analyses,22 policy reports,23 or case studies.24 Em-
pirical research relevant to the topic of this article is limited.
15. C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 5–6 (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police
_department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/NC96-APJW] [hereinafter INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON 
POLICE DEP’T].
16. See id. at 3–7 (providing examples of “serious offenses” like assault, driving while intoxi-
cated, and stealing; listing traffic violations as an example of a nonserious offense).
17. Id. at 7–8.
18. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., TARGETED FINES AND FEES AGAINST COMMUNITIES OF COLOR: CIVIL 
RIGHTS & CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 21–22 (2017), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2017/Statutory
_Enforcement_Report2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z27K-45LU]; Dan Kopf, The Fining of Black Ameri-
ca, PRICEONOMICS (June 24, 2016), https://priceonomics.com/the-fining-of-black-america/ [https://
perma.cc/4C3K-7V94].
19. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 18; Kopf, supra note 18.
20. See Daniel Hummel, Traffic Tickets: Public Safety Concerns or Budget Building Tools, 47 ADMIN.
& SOC’Y 298 (2015); see also Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, Political Economy at Any 
Speed: What Determines Traffic Citations?, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 509 (2009).
21. See, e.g., Dick M. Carpenter II, Richard Pochkanawala & Mindy Menjou, Municipal Fines 
and Fees: A 50-State Survey of State Laws, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR. (Apr. 30, 2020), https://
finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/articles/municipal-fines-and-fees-a-50-state-survey-of-state-laws/
[https://perma.cc/R34J-8382].
22. See, e.g., WILLIAM CROZIER, BRANDON GARRETT & THOMAS MAHER, DUKE L. CTR. FOR SCI. & JUST.,
THE EXPLOSION OF UNPAID CRIMINAL FINES AND FEES IN NORTH CAROLINA (2020), https://
sites.law.duke.edu/justsciencelab/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2020/04/CSJ-Criminal-Fines-and-Fees-
in-NC-v.7.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7X6-2ZRK]; MATTHEW MENENDEZ, MICHAEL F. CROWLEY, LAUREN-
BROOKE EISEN & NOAH ATCHISON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE STEEP COSTS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES 
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I. PRIOR RESEARCH FINDINGS
In examining the extent to which economic conditions may be re-
lated to municipal collection of fines and fees, at least one author has 
found no relationship between fiscal conditions, such as municipal tax 
revenue, and fines and fees generation. Singla et al. used a sample of 
ninety-three California cities spanning from 2010 to 2014 to examine if 
racial/ethnic composition, fiscal condition, and public safety were pre-
dictors of taxation by citation.25 Results indicated no significant rela-
tionship between fines and fees revenue and fiscal conditions or public 
safety metrics.26
Strikingly, however, a greater number of empirical findings suggest 
a revenue motivation behind municipal fines and fees behavior in the 
form of significant relationships between fiscal circumstances and fines 
and fees revenue. In some states, policy changes at the state level have 
appeared to compel municipalities to seek revenue through fines and 
fees. For example, Massachusetts instituted policies in 1980 that re-
quired property taxes to remain low, although residents in cities could 
vote to override the state policies and enact higher taxes in their own 
municipalities.27 Makowsky and Stratmann examined the extent to 
which municipalities responded to fiscal stress by pursuing revenue 
through traffic citations.28 Results indicated that drivers had a 26 per-
centage point “higher probability of being fined when stopped in mu-
nicipalities where voters rejected an override referendum.”29 Makowsky 
AND FINES: A FISCAL ANALYSIS OF THREE STATES AND TEN COUNTIES (2019), https://www.brennancenter.org
/sites/default/files/2019-11/2019_10_Fees%26Fines_Final5.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NWV-7PN4].
23. See, e.g., SHARON BRETT & MITALI NAGRECHA, HARV. L. SCH. CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM,
PROPORTIONATE FINANCIAL SANCTIONS: POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS FOR JUDICIAL REFORM (2019), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3759204.
24. See, e.g., MYESHA BRADEN, LEAH WATSON, TALIA GILBERT & JASON ENOS, LAWS.’ COMM. FOR 
C.R. UNDER L., TOO POOR TO PAY: HOW ARKANSAS’S OFFENDER-FUNDED JUSTICE SYSTEM DRIVES 
POVERTY & MASS INCARCERATION (2019), https://indd.adobe.com/view/f3b39ab5-1da5-409e-97a6-
a0b060d2f578 [https://perma.cc/DH5G-GPKJ]; DICK M. CARPENTER II, KYLE SWEETLAND & JENNIFER 
MCDONALD, INST. FOR JUST., THE PRICE OF TAXATION BY CITATION: CASE STUDIES OF THREE GEORGIA 
CITIES THAT RELY HEAVILY ON FINES AND FEES (2019), https://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10
/Taxation-by-Citation-FINAL-USE.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TUP-VJBD]; NEILY SEALY, ACADIA ROHER 
& WONDER LOWE, ARK. CMTY. INST., CAN’T WIN FOR LOSING: HOW INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES KEEP 
ARKANSANS IN DEBT (2020), https://237995-729345-1-raikfcquaxqncofqfm.stackpathdns.com/wp-content
/uploads/2020/01/Cant-Win-For-Losing-ACI-Debt-Report-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6MDZ-E2PE].
25. Akheil Singla, Charlotte Kirschner & Samuel B. Stone, Race, Representation, and Revenue: 
Reliance on Fines and Forfeitures in City Governments, 56 URB. AFFS. REV. 1132 (2019).
26. Id. at 1146–49.
27. Singla et al., supra note 25.
28. Makowsky & Stratmann, supra note 20.
29. Id. at 517.
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and Stratmann concluded, “[t]his finding is consistent with the political 
economy model’s prediction that fiscal distress leads to higher speeding 
fines.”30 In a subsequent analysis, the authors further found that pas-
sage of an override referendum led to a drop in the number of traffic ci-
tations written overall by 14.3 tickets.31
Like Massachusetts, California voters in 1978 adopted Proposition 
13 to restrict property tax rates.32 Dr. Sanghee Park gathered finance 
data from fifty-seven California counties spanning from 2000 to 2010 
to determine the extent to which governments turned to fines and fees 
during periods of fiscal stress.33 Results indicated that for every 1% in-
crease in the county unemployment rate, there was a 0.32% increase in 
the overall non-tax revenue, and for every one-dollar decrease in aver-
age housing price, the overall non-tax revenue increased by 0.015%.34
Public finance expert Dr. Min Su performed a similar analysis on fifty-
seven California counties between 2004 and 2015, and found that a 10 
percentage point tax revenue loss in the previous year was associated 
with a forty to forty-two cent increase in per capita traffic fines in the 
current year.35 As Su described the effect: “Considering that the average 
per capita traffic fine for all counties is $4.16, this increase is approxi-
mately 10 percent of counties’ average per capita traffic fines.”36
Other authors have found similar effects in states without property 
tax reforms. Data from ninety-six North Carolina counties from 1990 to 
2003 indicated that for every 1% increase in the unemployment rate, 
there was a .08% increase in traffic tickets.37 Traffic tickets increased 
even more when municipalities reported negative revenue growth in 
the previous year. A 10% revenue growth decrease brought an increase 
in traffic tickets of 6.4%.38 Finally, Hummel’s nationwide study found a 
significant relationship between state credit ratings and traffic ticket 
queries on Google (a proxy for traffic tickets), although he found no re-
lationship between unemployment and traffic ticket queries.39
30. Id.
31. Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, More Tickets, Fewer Accidents: How Cash-
Strapped Towns Make for Safer Roads, 54 J.L. & ECON. 863, 876 (2011).
32. What Is Proposition 13?, CAL. TAX DATA, https://www.californiataxdata.com/pdf/Prop13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NF7X-JK53] (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
33. See Sanghee Park, Local Revenue Structure Under Economic Hardship: Reliance on Alternative 
Revenue Sources in California Counties, 43 LOC. GOV’T STUD. 645 (2017).
34. Id. at 657.
35. Su, supra note 1.
36. Id. at 42.
37. Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, Red Ink in the Rearview Mirror: Local Fiscal Conditions 
and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets, 52 J.L. & ECON. 71, 83 (2009).
38. Id. at 87.
39. Hummel, supra note 20, at 310–13.
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Public officials routinely deny any revenue motivation, instead 
pointing to the public safety rationale.40 Yet, Singla et al. found no rela-
tionships between public safety metrics and fines and fees generation.41
Other research, however, suggests there may in fact be such be a rela-
tionship. An analysis of data collected from the Massachusetts Highway 
Department and Highway Safety Division from April 2001 through Jan-
uary 2003 found 100 extra tickets per month per community led to 14.3 
fewer car crashes.42 A study of nationwide data spanning 2008 to 2010 
found states that issued more tickets per capita saw fewer fatal car ac-
cidents.43 And in a study of Massachusetts traffic ticket data from No-
vember and December 2002, Luca found that a 1% increase in tickets is-
sued led to a 0.28% decline in motor vehicle accidents.44
Thus, a lively and important debate continues about the extent to 
which public officials pursue fines and fees primarily as a revenue de-
vice. Although the studies cited above provide valuable findings, fines 
and fees are an important policy topic that would benefit from addi-
tional scrutiny. We do so with several unique contributions.
First, we use a nationwide panel of municipalities drawn from the 
Census of Governments. As Hummel noted, much of the prior litera-
ture focuses on case studies, such as certain localities or cities, and “[i]t 
would be much more generalizable to expand those analyses to include 
multiple communities across the United States covering the 50 states.”45
The sample is large—with almost 1,500 cities and towns—and it is di-
verse, ranging from small communities of approximately 100 residents 
to the nation’s largest cities. We also use a long panel, spanning 2005 to 
2017. This is particularly relevant to our examination of the relationship 
between economic conditions and fines and fees revenue generation, 
given the years of the Great Recession fall in the middle of the panel.
40. See Simmons, supra note 2; see also Andria Simmons, Traffic Tickets: Some Cities Use Inter-
states as Cash Registers, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (July 10, 2018), https://www.ajc.com/news/local/traffic-
tickets-some-cities-use-interstates-cash-registers/PULjG07fwkFbQUadT4YGvL/ [https://perma.cc
/WU7Q-X4NY] [hereinafter Traffic Tickets]; Carrie Teegardin, Georgia Traffic Courts Taking a Bite out of 
Tax Refunds, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.ajc.com/news/crime—law/georgia-
traffic-courts-taking-bite-out-tax-refunds/CoHjEwRntiGTm2yN6R7v2N/ [https://perma.cc/63M4-
MCEA].
41. Singla et al., supra note 25.
42. Makowsky & Stratmann, supra note 31, at 879.
43. Hummel, supra note 20, at 319.
44. Dara Lee Luca, Do Traffic Tickets Reduce Motor Vehicle Accidents? Evidence from a Natural Exper-
iment, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 85, 88 (2014).
45. Hummel, supra note 20, at 314.
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II. METHODS
Similar to Singla et al.,46 our study is guided by the primary re-
search question: is there a significant relationship between fines and 
fees revenue and the Great Recession?
A. Data, Sample & Variables
Like Sances and You’s cross-sectional study,47 our data came from 
the Census of Governments (CoG) maintained by the U.S. Census Bu-
reau and the American Community Survey (ACS).48 The CoG is an an-
nual collection of descriptive, employment, and finance data from 
states, counties, municipalities, and special districts, such as school 
districts and water districts. In years ending in 2 and 7, the data repre-
sent a census; all other years represent a sample. We use community 
characteristics from the ACS as control variables in our analyses.
The CoG is not available as a panel, so we constructed one by pool-
ing data from all years spanning 2005 through 2017. Most years collect 
data from a sample rather than a census of municipalities. To create a 
balanced panel where all cities appear in all years, we retained in our 
sample only those municipalities that appeared in all thirteen years of 
data, which resulted in a sample of 1,471 cities.49 We further limited the 
46. Singla et al., supra note 25.
47. Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Who Pays for Government? Descriptive Representation 
and Exploitative Revenue Sources, 79 J. POL. 1090 (2017).
48. Census of Governments, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys
/cog.html [https://perma.cc/FN4U-SBJJ] (last visited June 5, 2021); American Community Survey (ACS),
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs [https://perma.cc/S3RK-JU6S] 
(last visited June 5, 2021).
49. Methodology, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/gov-
finances/technical-documentation/methodology.html [https://perma.cc/MV85-A2AM] (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2021) . We dropped 10,314 municipalities to create the balanced panel. Excluded cities had 
smaller percentages of persons of color (20% versus 29% in sample cities), slightly higher mean in-
comes ($51,527 versus $50,156), and were smaller (mean population 8,383 versus 80,047). This 
means the panel dataset we created is biased toward larger municipalities. In creating the sample 
in non-census years, certain municipalities always receive an invitation to submit data (participa-
tion is voluntary, but annual response rates are approximately 90%). These include, among others, 
larger cities (e.g., populations greater than 75,000) and municipalities with revenues above a cer-
tain threshold. Moreover, the Census of Government’s use of a cut-off sampling methodology re-
duces the number of small municipalities in the sample. This is intended to reduce respondent 
burden and processing costs for small municipalities with limited human and fiscal resources. 
Finally, each year the Census of Governments uses imputation to fill in missing or spurious data. 
In the 2016 data, for example, 18.7% of the data points we used in this study were imputed. Miss-
ingness occurs primarily due to nonresponse. Spurious data are identified by comparing responses 
within an annual dataset or between years. Inconsistencies in responses that exceed certain 
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sample to only cities and towns, thereby excluding counties and special 
districts, and only to those municipalities that reported judicial expend-
itures. The latter criterion was designed to ensure that the sample in-
cluded only cities and towns that have or had access to the means to 
generate revenue via citations. Including municipalities without such 
means would artificially depress measures of fines and fees activity by 
spuriously conflating municipalities that have the means for processing 
and collecting fines and fees and municipalities that lack the means al-
together. The former theoretically face incentives to pursue fines and 
fees revenue and have the means to respond to such incentives whereas 
the latter do not. Including cities without such resources would con-
found our ability to measure municipal responses to incentives.
Consistent with prior empirical work,50 we chose commonly used 
measures of community characteristics and finances for our analyses. 
In all analyses, fines and fees revenue—drawn from the CoG—was the 
dependent variable (DV). This was represented as a percentage of gen-
eral revenue. The primary independent variables (IV) were years and 
years squared, which capture the fines and fees trend before, during, 
and after the Great Recession. The years variable is a simple integer 
count, beginning with zero, of the number of years in the panel. The 
year 2005 is coded as zero, 2006 is coded as one, 2007 is coded as two, 
and so forth. Years squared is then the created by mathematically 
squaring the year variable.
Taken together, these two variables enable us to measure whether 
there is a curvilinear trend in fines and fees revenue that comports with 
the Great Recession. By itself, time is a linear variable that enables us to 
measure whether there is a linear trend in the fines and fees data across 
the years measured, and if so, whether that trend is increasing or de-
creasing. Time squared measures whether there is a curve in the trend, 
and if so, the direction of the curve. Interpreted together, the variables 
can indicate the magnitude of the trend and the point in time at which a 
trend changes, if, in fact, it does change.
An alternate approach is to replace the trend variables with indica-
tor variables representing each year in the panel. Among other ad-
vantages, this method—unlike the use of trend variables—provides 
precise estimates of the outcome variable for each year as compared to 
the first year in the panel (assuming that the first year is used as the 
thresholds are flagged as spurious and replaced/imputed. Imputations are made by consulting 
alternative data sources or estimating a data point by inferring from another year and adjusting 
for growth or inferring from a similar municipality.
50. See Hummel, supra note 20; Makowsky & Stratmann, supra note 20; see also Singla et al., 
supra note 25; Su, supra note 1; Sances & You, supra note 47.
902 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:4
comparison). In combination, the coefficients can also be used to dis-
cern a trend in the outcome variable, similar to the trend variables de-
scribed above. As for those variables, the trend in fines and fees genera-
tion across the years studied proved to be rather smooth (as illustrated 
below), rather than a series of peaks and valleys. This made it fitting to 
use time trend variables.51 Both approaches come with advantages, so 
we present both below. 
Control variables in the analyses were community characteristics 
drawn from the ACS and the CoG: percent minority, median household 
income, population size, and police expenditures. These variables have 
proven important to control for in the studies discussed above, and so 
we did likewise.
As Table 1 indicates, the sample cities varied significantly on every 
variable in the analysis. The variable of particular interest is the per-
centage of revenue cities generated through fines and fees. On average, 
cities generated only approximately 1% of revenue from this source, but 
the percentage differed substantially throughout the sample. As for 
community characteristics, the sample included very small municipali-
ties to the nation’s largest cities. On average, almost 30% of the resi-
dents in the sample cities were people of color, and the mean household 
income was just over $50,000.
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE SAMPLE
Minimum Maximum Mean SD
Population 
(number of 
people) 92.00 8,550,405.00 80,047.73 286,058.35
Percent minority 
(percentage) 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.26
Household 
income (dollars) 13,521.00 162,011.00 50,155.99 16,337.58
Percent revenue 
from fines/fees 




dollars) 0.00 5,423,434.00 24,687.79 142,414.86
51. The use of the time trend variable is a more parsimonious regression model, which is 
generally a desirable feature.
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B. Analysis
The analyses used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with 
random effects, which enabled us to examine the relationship between 
the recession—as captured in the time variables—and fines and fees 
revenue after controlling all other variables in the equation.52 The for-
mal regression model using time trend variables took the form:
%F/F Revenueit+1 = 0 + 1(populationit) + 2(median incomeit) + 
3(%minorityit) + 4(law enforcement spendingit) + 8(timei) + 
9(timei2) + eit 
The terms for years and years squared measure the relationship be-
tween the Great Recession and fines and fees revenue. If there is a rela-
tionship between fines and fees and the recession, we should expect to 
see a convex parabola with the peak at the time of the recession. This 
would be captured in a positive and significant coefficient for year and 
a negative and significant coefficient for year squared.
The formal model using year indicator variables took the form:
%F/F Revenueit+1 = 0 + 1(populationit) + 2(median incomeit) + 
3(%minorityit) + 4(law enforcement spendingit) + 5(2006) + 
52. We also replicated the models using fixed-effects, an approach frequently used in re-
search on this topic at the municipal, county, or judicial district level. See, e.g., Makowsky & Strat-
mann, supra note 31; Park, supra note 30; Siân Mughan, Fine and Fee Revenues, Local Courts and 
Judicial Elections: The Role of Financial and Political Institutions in Extractive Revenue Practices 
in U.S. Cities 15 (May 22, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3392412 [https://perma.cc/T49Y-NLCB]. This analysis exploits the panel 
nature of the data and controls for time-invariant variables not included in the regression equa-
tion. All non- or quasi-experimental research suffers from omitted variable bias, wherein some 
variable not present in the equation may be significantly related to the outcome variable and con-
found the relationship between the IV and the DV. See Kevin A. Clarke, The Phantom Menace: Omit-
ted Variable Bias in Econometric Research, 22 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 341 (2005). Fixed-effects 
control for time-invariant variables not present in the analysis, but they do not control omitted 
time-varying variables. Thus, compared to a traditional OLS regression, fixed-effects greatly im-
prove the estimate of the relationship between the IV and DV by establishing a more isolated corre-
lation between the two. Josef Bruderl & Volker Ludwig, Fixed-Effects Panel Regression, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND CAUSAL INFERENCE 327, 331 (Henry Best & Christof Wolf 
eds., 2015). Fixed-effects regression “discards the between variation and infers the causal effect 
from within the variation only,” but it is still not technically causal. Id. at 331. The disadvantage to 
fixed-effects analysis is its restriction on the effects of a variable—time, in this case—to vary by 
sampled unit—municipality, in this case. Random effects models, conversely, allow for this. 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange testing indicated a random effects model was more appropriate under 
report fixed-effects results in footnotes 54 and 55, infra.
904 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 54:4
6(2007) + 7(2008) + 8(2009) + 9(2010) + 10(2011) + 11(2012) + 
12(2013) + 13(2014) + 14(2015) + 15(2016) + eit 
The variables of interest in this analysis are the time variables, 2006 
through 2016. Each is compared to the year 2005, which is omitted to 
facilitate the comparison. If there is a relationship between fines and 
fees and the recession, we should expect to see the largest coefficients 
during the recession, followed by coefficients decreasing in magnitude 
in subsequent years.53
III. RESULTS
In examining whether there is a relationship between fines and fees 
activity and the Great Recession, Figure 1 provides perhaps the clearest 
illustration of the relationship. From 2005 to 2017, the peak of fines and 
fees revenue collection occurred during the years 2009 and 2010, which 
corresponds to the Great Recession. According to Rich,54 the recession 
began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009, but the effects con-
tinued to be felt for years after.55 Indeed, Piskorski and Seru estimate 
that regions “that recovered to pre-crisis levels took on average four to 
53. In addition to these models, we ran a similar interrupted time series model with regres-
sion terms measuring intercepts and slopes at the time of and after the recession. See JUDITH D.
SINGER & JOHN B. WILLETT, APPLIED LONGITUDINAL DATA ANALYSIS, ch. 6 (2003). Results were very 
similar to those of the first regression model described in the analysis section. We also ran the 
random effects model with time trend variables in a multilevel analysis with random slopes and 
intercepts for time. See JOOP HOX, MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS: TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS (2002); 
Joop J. Hox, Multilevel Analyses of Grouped and Longitudinal Data, in MODELING LONGITUDINAL AND 
MULTILEVEL DATA: PRACTICAL ISSUES, APPLIED APPROACHES AND SPECIFIC EXAMPLES (Todd D. Little, 
Kai U. Schnabel & Jürgen Baumert eds., 2000). Results were almost identical to those reported 
below. Finally, we ran multiple models that examined different alignments between time and fines 
and fees revenue. The first treated time and revenue contemporaneously, and the second shifted 
fines and fees revenue ahead by one year. The first one assumed that municipalities responded 
immediately to economic conditions and adjusted municipal ordinance activities to generate in-
come. The second, following Hummel, supra note 20 and Su, supra note 1, assumed the responses 
of municipalities were not immediate, and instead conditions within a given fiscal year strongly 
influenced subsequent fiscal year revenue-raising efforts in non-tax revenue sources, namely or-
dinance citations. Goodness of fit statistics indicated a slightly better fit for the first model. That is 
what we report below. All of the alternative models described here are available from the authors.
54. Robert Rich, The Great Recession, FED.RSRV.HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org
/essays/great_recession_of_200709[https://perma.cc/F7MM-WHE5].
55. See Finn E. Kydland & Carlos E.J.M. Zarazaga, Fiscal Sentiment and the Weak Recovery from 
the Great Recession: A Quantitative Exploration, 79 J. MONETARY ECON. 109 (2016).
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five years from the depths of the Great Recession.”56 This estimate cor-
responds to the trend in Figure 1. The peak of fiscal stress is the peak of 
fines and fees revenue generation, and as the economy—particularly 
property values (and corresponding property tax revenue)—recovered, 
fines and fees revenue declined.
FIGURE 1
AVERAGE FINES AND FEES REVENUE BY YEAR
Of course, the difference between the lowest point and the peak is 
only 0.17 percentage points, but the regression results from Model 1 in 
Table 2 indicate that the trend is statistically significant. The variables 
of interest are time and time squared, which must be interpreted in 
tandem to understand the results. The coefficient for time is positive, 
indicating that the initial slope of fines and fees revenue is positive. The 
coefficient for time squared, however, is negative, indicating that at 
some point the trend curves downward. The graph indicates that the 
inflection occurred in 2009/2010. This is confirmed empirically by the 
equation - 1/2* 2, where 1 equals the coefficient for time and 2
equals the coefficient for time squared. This equation empirically indi-
cates the inflection point in curvilinear trends. In our analysis, the con-
ditional product of the equation—that is, the product after controlling 
for other variables in the equation—is 4.2, which essentially corre-
sponds to calendar year (CY) 2009 (in the analysis, time is scaled so that 
2005 equals 0, 2006 equals 1, and so forth).  Recall, however, that in the 
regression analysis the fines and fees revenues are shifted ahead one 
56. Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru, Debt Relief and Slow Recovery: A Decade After Lehman 1 (Nat’l
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year (e.g., CY 2006 corresponds to revenue year (RY) 2007, CY 2007 cor-
responds to RY 2008, and so forth). This means the peak of the time 
trend corresponds to CY 2009 and RY 2010.57
This is also illustrated with Model 2 in Table 2. As hypothesized 
above, coefficients beginning with 2006 increase in magnitude until 
reaching the largest numbers in CYs 2008 and 2009 (RYs 2009 and 2010) 
and then generally decreasing again, albeit irregularly, to CY 2016 (RY 
2017).58 Thus, the results from Models 1 and 2 confirm the trend present 
in Figure 1: fines and fees revenue peaked at the height of the Great Re-
cession and receded as the recession also receded. In plain terms, this 
means that when municipal fiscal stress was at its greatest point, cities 
took in the greatest share of fines and fees revenue, and as the fiscal 
stress waned, the percentage of fines and fees revenue decreased.
57. In the fixed-effects analysis, the results are almost identical: time coefficient = .027, p = 
0.010; time2 coefficient = -.003, p = .001.
58. In the fixed-effects analysis, the results are almost identical. 2008 coefficient = .089, p = 
0.003. 2009 coefficient = -.084, p = .011. For years before and after 2008–09, the coefficients are 
gradually smaller.
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TABLE 2
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINES AND FEES 
REVENUE AND THE GREAT RECESSION
Model 1 Model 2
Coef. SE p Coef. SE p
Intercept 1.399 0.082 0.000 1.297 0.081 0.000
Population 0.000 0.000 0.141 0.000 0.000 0.106
Percent
minority -0.037 0.039 0.344 0.237 0.152 0.119
Income 0.000 0.000 0.557 0.000 0.000 0.772
Police
expenditures 0.000 0.000 0.215 0.000 0.000 0.192
Time 0.025 0.010 0.011
Time2 -0.003 0.001 0.001
2006 0.017 0.022 0.445
2007 0.068 0.030 0.024
2008 0.090 0.030 0.003
2009 0.089 0.033 0.007
2010 0.079 0.033 0.018
2011 0.064 0.035 0.067
2012 0.022 0.035 0.533
2013 -0.210 0.107 0.049
2014 0.020 0.074 0.791
2015 -0.059 0.038 0.117
2016 -0.045 0.053 0.398
Note: Standard errors are clustered by city. 
Decreasing fines and fees percentages could, of course, be a more 
mathematical phenomenon than a decision by city officials to engage in 
less municipal ordinance enforcement as the economy improved. For 
example, fines and fees revenue—the numerator in the fines and fees 
percentage above—could have remained somewhat constant over time 
while general revenue—the denominator—could have decreased due to 
the recession and then gradually increased during the recovery.  
We tested for that possibility by examining trends in the dollar 
amounts collected through fines and fees. We used the same basic ran-
dom effects models described above, using fines and fees dollar 
amounts as the outcome variable and controlling only for population, 
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since this is a descriptive exercise. This analysis also does not shift the 
fines and fees revenue ahead by year. As Table 3 illustrates, the results 
in both models show a curvilinear trend to the amount of money raised 
through fines and fees (the coefficients here are interpreted just as in 
Table 2). This suggests that the results reported in Table 2 are not pri-
marily a mathematical phenomenon.  
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TABLE 3
REGRESSION RESULTS EXAMINING FINES AND FEES 
DOLLAR AMOUNTS OVER TIME
Model 1 Model 2
Coef. SE p Coef. SE p
Intercept -3917.741 1719.248 0.023 -3930.870 1736.857 0.024
Population 0.078 0.024 0.001 0.078 0.024 0.001
Time 97.246 24.712 0.000
Time2 -7.280 1.710 0.000
2006 61.818 33.280 0.063
2007 137.255 44.986 0.002
2008 246.369 56.563 0.000
2009 346.663 71.884 0.000
2010 400.657 71.439 0.000
2011 372.213 84.572 0.000
2012 362.450 132.202 0.006
2013 224.845 148.567 0.130
2014 158.727 138.611 0.252
2015 146.474 141.392 0.300
2016 254.276 163.787 0.121
2017 212.574 130.873 0.104
A final note about the results in Table 2: although the community 
characteristics of percent minority and household income were not of 
primary interest here, it is nonetheless interesting that neither proved 
to be significantly related to fines and fees revenue. This is contrary to a 
number of articles finding that communities with greater percentages 
of minorities or persons with low income took in more revenue through 
fines and fees.59 It remains an open question whether the generation of 
fines and fees shows racial bias, as Shoub et al. suggest,60 or, as Sances 
and You conclude, “[o]ne interpretation of our results is that cash-
59. Mughan, supra note 52, at 19; Noli Brazil, The Unequal Spatial Distribution of City Government 
Fines: The Case of Parking Tickets in Los Angeles, 56 URB. AFFS. REV. 823 (2018); see also Brandi Blesset & 
Richard C. Box, Sharecropper Finance: Using the Justice System as a Public Revenue Source, 18 PUB.
INTEGRITY 113 (2016); Sances & You, supra note 47; Singla et al., supra note 25; Su, supra note 1.
60. Kelsey Shoub, Leah Christiani, Frank R. Baumgartner, Derek A. Epp & Kevin Roach, Fines, 
Fees, Forfeitures, and Disparities: A Link Between Municipal Reliance on Fines and Racial Disparities in Policing,
0 POL’Y STUD. J. 1, 21–22 (2020), https://fbaum.unc.edu/articles/PSJ-2020-Fines.pdf [https://perma.cc
/K466-MMN3].
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strapped cities target poor and minority voters simply because they are 
less likely to complain and not due to any inherent bias.”61
IV. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
Although the percent minority and income results in Table 2 were 
inconsistent with many prior studies, our primary findings are con-
sistent with earlier research discerning a relationship between fiscal 
stress and fines and fees revenue.62 Our findings are distinctive because 
of the large, national sample, long time span, and the occurrence of a 
significant recession in the middle of the study period. The recession 
proved particularly revealing because of the economic recovery that fol-
lowed the recession. It enabled us to allow for two possibilities. In the 
first, if municipal ordinance enforcement is primarily driven by a public 
health and safety motivation, there is little reason to expect to see the 
trend in decreasing fines and fees revenue in the post-recessionary pe-
riod.63 In contrast, the second possibility contemplates municipal code 
enforcement motivated primarily by revenue generation, which would 
be manifest in a fines and fees revenue trend tied to the economic trend 
of the recession. That is indeed what we found.
Of course, city leaders and municipal judges routinely deny revenue 
motivations.64 For example, when municipal courts in Georgia began 
intercepting state income tax refunds of people who failed to pay traffic 
tickets or other court fines, Atlanta municipal court judge Gary E. Jack-
son defended the scheme as a means to protect public safety. “We’re not 
here to raise money,” he said. “Our job is public safety.”65
In rare moments of candor, however, some public officials 
acknowledge revenue motivations. Warwick, Georgia, for example, 
boasts a new police headquarters and a renovated community center 
61. Sances & You, supra note 47, at 1093.
62. Makowsky & Stratmann, supra note 20; Makowsky & Stratmann, supra note 31; Park, su-
pra note 33; Su, supra note 1.
63. See Hummel, supra note 20 (suggesting public safety concerns have a significant and larg-
er positive effect on the issuance of traffic tickets than budget concerns).
64. See, e.g., Maciag, supra note 3. In Seat Pleasant, Maryland, population 4,800, Police Chief 
Devan Martin defended his almost $4 million in fines revenue—much of it from speed and red-
light cameras—by insisting: “The purpose of the program is not for the potential financial revenue 
that’s generated from it . . . . Our only purpose is to curb behavior to improve traffic safety and 
public safety.” Maciag, supra note 3.
65. Teegardin, supra note 40.
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that also functions as a municipal court.66 It is a small town with less 
than 500 residents and a small business tax base.67 The town’s upgrades 
were paid for by fines and fees: “‘We had the opportunity to generate 
revenue on Highway 300,’ explained City Councilman Ronnie Fennell. 
‘And that’s what we did.’ . . . The city generated $3,113 for every [person] 
living in its borders . . . . ‘I knew what revenue was being generated,’ 
Councilman Fennell said. ‘And let me tell you something. I liked it.’”68
In another example, when Jonesboro, Georgia, topped the list of 
traffic ticket revenue generators in an analysis by the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, a “city councilman said he fear[ed] the priority [was] mak-
ing money, not serving the community.”69 “I don’t know if it’s to ‘protect 
and serve’ or to ‘collect and serve,’” said city Councilman Robby L. Wig-
gins. “A lot of times, that’s what it seems like to me.”70
James Tignanelli, president of the Police Officers Association of 
Michigan union, similarly noted, “When elected officials say, ‘We need 
more money,’ they can’t look to the department of public works to raise 
revenues, so where do they find it? Police departments.”71 Police Chief 
Michael Reaves of Utica, Michigan, likewise observed, “When I first 
started in this job 30 years ago, police work was never about revenue 
enhancement, but if you’re a chief now, you have to look at whether 
your department produces revenues.”72
As Ginkowski described, revenue-raising motivations distort law 
enforcement priorities away from protecting public health and safety.73
These motivations also run counter to court decisions about the revenue 
motivation in code enforcement.74 Yet, courts have found that mone-
tary sanctions may “at least pay the cost of enforcement of ordinances 
and regulations” and “be imposed to effect compliance and deter viola-





69. Traffic Tickets, supra note 40.
70. Traffic Tickets, supra note 40.




73. See Ginkowski, supra note 10.
74. Vill. of Sister Bay v. Hockers, 317 N.W.2d 505, 508 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (indicating that 
“[t]he primary purpose of an ordinance cannot be the raising of revenue in lieu of taxation. . .”); 
State ex rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger, 201 N.W.2d 778, 781 n.1 (Wis. 1972) (indicating that “[r]evenue 
production is not a legitimate basis for imposing a fine.”). 
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tions.”75 Thus, legal reform may be complicated, but it is possible. The 
framework provided by Carpenter et al. proves particularly helpful to 
this end.76 Their framework describes state-level reforms that may assist 
in removing the financial incentives that can compel municipal taxation 
by citation. Such an approach would be a more systematic method of 
reform rather than advocating for change at the city level.
Likely one of the most significant reforms would be to eliminate 
municipal courts, which, unlike state courts, may have financial inter-
ests in the outcomes of the cases they hear. The structure of municipal 
courts requires self-financing through either fees attached to the cases 
they hear or budget allocations from municipalities. Both financing 
methods leave municipal courts open to pressure from municipal lead-
ers to generate fines revenue through more convictions. State courts 
lack this structure, and as a result generally have greater financial inde-
pendence.
State-level reforms can also (a) reduce municipalities’ need for fines 
and fees revenue, (b) limit municipalities’ control over revenue collected 
by municipal courts, and (c) safeguard those courts’ independence. Tak-
ing each in turn, states can reduce municipalities’ demand for fines and 
fees revenue by capping fines and fees as a percentage of a municipali-
ty’s budget and giving municipalities greater flexibility in raising reve-
nue. The first of those is arguably the most important. If municipalities 
cannot keep fines and fees revenue above a certain cap or must allocate 
revenue raised by their courts to school or hospital funds, this limits 
their financial incentive to pursue such revenue streams.
As for flexibility in raising revenue, greater diversity of municipal 
revenue sources reduces the need to rely on a particular source, espe-
cially during times of fiscal stress. Indeed, Deller and Watson’s analysis 
found that cities with greater economic diversity saw greater economic 
stability during the Great Recession.77 To support their activities, mu-
nicipal governments generally rely on a variety of income sources. Their 
main source is taxes, primarily property taxes. “Excise taxes targeting 
specific transactions (e.g., tobacco and alcohol)” or groups (tourists’ 
meals, hotels, and rental cars) are popular as well.78 Municipal sales tax-
es generate small proportions of municipal revenue.79 Revenue also 
comes from fees (such as those associated with business licenses), ser-
75. Hockers, 317 N.W.2d at 508.
76. See Carpenter et al., supra note 21.
77. Steven Deller & Philip Watson, Did Regional Economic Diversity Influence the Effects of the 
Great Recession?, 54 ECON. INQUIRY 1824, 1832 (2016).
78. See Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Fines: The Folly of Conflating the Power to Fine with the Power to 
Tax, 62 VILL. L. REV. 925, 930 (2017).
79. Id. at 930, 940–945.
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vice charges (the costs governments charge for providing services like 
waste collection),80 and grants or other transfers of money from other 
governments.81 Some municipalities generate revenue through public 
enterprises, such as utilities.82 Cities with such enterprises often have 
lower property tax rates because utility revenue acts as a substitute for 
other types of revenue generation.83 During the 2009 recession, for ex-
ample, increasing fees on water, sewer, and waste collection was the 
most frequently used method of generating revenue in Illinois cities 
that provided such services.84
Specific to the primary source of municipal funding—property tax-
es—limitations on this form of “revenue generation may be externally 
imposed . . . through constitutional or statutory requirements intended 
to provide taxpayer relief—a relatively recent but widespread prac-
tice.”85 Lacking diverse revenue sources, localities experiencing fiscal 
stress who are unwilling to cut services or reduce spending may opt to 
“increase reliance on fees and fines generated through the exercise of 
the police power to fill the revenue gap.”86
To limit municipalities’ control over revenue collected by municipal 
courts, state reform could include prohibiting municipalities from 
budgeting for court revenue to discourage dependence on it. Budgeting 
for court revenue is widely practiced by cities and has now become a 
prominent part of an ongoing case in Doraville, Georgia.87 The Atlanta 
suburb of a little more than 10,000 citizens became notorious for its 
revenue-generating speed traps and housing code enforcement cases.88
Each year, the suburb budgeted “between 17 and 30[%]of [its] overall ex-
80. Id. at 929.
81. Tracy Gordon, State and Local Budgets and the Great Recession, BROOKINGS (Dec. 31, 2012), 
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/state-and-local-budgets-and-the-great-recession/ [https://
perma.cc/2W35-FUBG].
82. See, e.g., Theodore J. Stumm & Aman Khan, Effects of Utility Enterprise Fund Subsidization on 
Municipal Taxes and Expenditures, 28 STATE & LOC. GOV’T REV. 103 (1996); Dick M. Carpenter II, Kyle 
Sweetland & Jennifer McDonald, A Case Study of Municipal Taxation by Citation, CRIM. JUST. POL.
REV. 1 (2021).
83. Stumm & Khan, supra note 82, at 104.
84. Norman Walzer & Andy Blanke, Municipal Fiscal Responses in the Post-Recession Era, 3 ILL.
MUN. POL’Y J. 67, 73 (2018).
85. Wigfall Robinson, supra note 78, at 929.
86. Id. at 931.
87. Police Must Serve and Protect, Not Ticket to Collect, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/case
/doraville-ticketing/ [https://perma.cc/GSB3-E2Y9] (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
88. Simmons, supra note 2; Christine Fonville, Fines and Fees: Is Doraville Ticketing for Revenue? A 
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pected revenue [to] come from fines and fees issued by its police offic-
ers and code inspectors.”89 A 2015 Doraville newsletter bragged that “av-
eraging nearly 15,000 cases and bringing in over $3 million annually,” 
Doraville’s court system “contributes heavily to the city’s bottom line.”90
Combined with other reforms we discuss here, prohibiting cities from 
such budgeting could significantly reduce revenue-generating incen-
tives in fines and fees.
Turning to safeguarding courts’ independence, states can guaran-
tee courts funding in their laws so that courts do not have to depend on 
municipalities for support. States can also require municipal courts to 
function separately from the political—that is, legislative and execu-
tive—branches of municipal government. Among other practices, this 
may entail preventing city councils and mayors from appointing or re-
moving judges; barring mayors or their designees from sitting as judg-
es; organizing prosecutors and other law enforcement officers in sepa-
rate offices from court personnel; and physically removing courts from 
police departments.
Likely the best-known example of a need for separation comes from 
Ferguson, Missouri, where city leaders urged the appointed police chief 
and municipal court judge to make maximizing revenue their priority 
and worked in league with them to meet significant budget increases in 
revenue from citations.91 The quintessential need for separation, how-
ever, is in Ohio and Louisiana’s mayors’ court systems. “Mayor’s courts 
are local courts that hear traffic and local ordinance violations.”92 Unlike 
traditional municipal courts presided over by a judge, cases in mayor’s 
courts are decided by the mayor or their designee—the same person re-
sponsible for overseeing the city’s finances. As the ACLU of Ohio con-
cludes, such courts “operate with perverse incentives to prioritize reve-
nue generation over delivery of justice.”93 Since approximately 300 and 
250 such courts operate in Ohio94 and Louisiana respectively,95 the need 
89. Fonville, supra note 88.
90. Corally Rivera and Her Team Help Keep Administrative “Order in the Court,” 2 DORAVILLE 
INSIGHT 1, 3 (2015), https://cms1files.revize.com/doravillega/Departments/Public%20Information
/spring2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RM2-J9QS].
91. See INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEP’T, supra note 15.
92. Mayor’s Courts, ACLU OHIO, https://www.acluohio.org/en/campaigns/mayors-courts [https://
perma.cc/9HCH-H3X7] (last visited June 5, 2021); accord Mayor’s Court, LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR 3, https://
app.lla.state.la.us/llala.nsf/A6809D408B35FA9286257AB8006E9684/$FILE/Mayor%27s%20Court%
20FAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/5F6B-BDJ3] (last updated July 2020).
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for separation between judicial and executive/legislative functions is 
not trivial.
Although awareness of the issue of revenue generation through 
fines and fees was once confined to periodic complaints about speed 
traps and traffic tickets,96 it has grown to much greater prominence in 
recent years. Of particular concern are questions about the extent to 
which cities’ use of municipal ordinance enforcement transcends public 
health and safety into taxation by citation. Our empirical results sug-
gest that there is a reason for such concern. This problem is not, how-
ever, an intractable one. The reforms we outline above—along with 
others proposed by Carpenter et al.,97 the Fines and Fees Justice Cen-
ter,98 and others99—can go a long way to ameliorating a legal problem 
that is ultimately of our own making.
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